摘要
理论研究表明集团向公司提供担保可以促进公司与金融中介形成优化债务契约，从而缓解公司的融资约束程度。本文以1999—2010年中国A股上市公司关联担保为研究对象，考察来自集团关联方的担保机制对公司融资约束的影响。控制了内生性问题的影响之后，结果表明集团关联担保可以显著降低上市公司担保当年的融资约束水平，同时还加强了公司的信贷能力，进而使公司在以后年度仍然保持较低的融资约束水平。使用双重差分方法的回归结果进一步验证了本文的发现，相对于没有接受过关联担保的公司，接受关联担保的公司在接受担保后融资约束显著降低。此外，本文的结果还表明接受关联担保还能够显著增加公司的投资水平和公司业绩。本文结果为集团化管理模式的优势提供了证据，同时有助于市场更加全面理解关联担保的经济后果。
Theoretical analysis explains the loan guarantee as part of an optimal debt contract. Using a sample of loan guarantees provided to the listed firms in China＇s stock markets during 1999 to 2010, we examine the impact of loan guarantees from related parties of business groups on firms＇ financial constraint. After controlling endogeneity problem, our empirical results indicate that the degree of financial constraint is significantly lower when firms receive loan guarantees from related parties. Furthermore, the financial constraint remains low in the subsequent years after they get loan guaranteed. Difference - in - difference model confirms our findings by showing that firms received loan guarantee have a lower level of financial constraint after the guarantee year, compared to those never received loan guarantee. Furthermore, firms received loan guarantee have higher capital investment and firm performance. Overall, our paper provides new evidence on the function of business groups and the role of loan guarantees from related parties.
出处
《金融研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2014年第9期192-206,共15页
Journal of Financial Research
基金
国家自然科学基金项目(70902004
71263034
71372048)
教育部人文社会科学研究西部和边疆地区项目(10XJC630003)
教育部"创新团队发展计划"项目(IRT1258)的资助
关键词
企业集团
贷款担保
关联方
融资约束
Business groups, Loan guarantee, Related parties, Financial constraints
