摘要
2010年《社会保险法》等几部法律法规出台后,针对农民工的社会保险政策发生很大转变,社保的缴费率和便携性均有提升。本文假设农民工参保意愿来自于对社会保险的预期收益,利用上海市杨浦区的调查数据,用Logistic模型分析了农民工社保参保情况及其主要影响因素,发现农民工是否参保主要取决于企业而不是农民工本身。企业通过多种方式逃避社保缴费,压低了农民工的社保参保率。在此基础上,本文分析总结企业社保逃费机制和社保政策在实际运行中的诸多困境和盲区,并综合参考新加坡、欧盟等发达国家的社保处理方法,提出相关政策建议。
Since the publication of Social Security Act, the social insurance policies towards migrant workers have changed by the increase of social security fees and portability. This paper uses the expected revenue of migrant workers to determine whether he will take part in the social insurance system. Using the Logistic model and data from Yangpu District, Shanghai City, it finds that it is factories rather than migrant workers themselves that determine the action of workers in social insurance system. Factories use many methods to escape the social security payments, lowering the participation rate of migrant workers. On this basis, it also concludes the conspiring phenomenon between workers and factories, the blindness of social security policies and the methods to deal with this problem combined with the experience of developed countries like Singapore and EU.
出处
《上海经济研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2014年第10期109-116,共8页
Shanghai Journal of Economics
关键词
社会保险
农民工
参保
合谋
Social Insurance
Migrant Worker
Insurance
Complicity
