摘要
基于名义薪酬业绩敏感度与真实薪酬业绩敏感,本文分析了管理层权力通过盈余管理进行薪酬操纵的方式。研究发现:薪酬操纵行为表现出时机选择特征,在盈利业绩下的薪酬操纵显著存在,而亏损业绩下的薪酬操纵并不显著。具体表现为管理层权力越大,薪酬与真实业绩敏感度越低,薪酬与名义盈利业绩敏感度越高,与名义亏损业绩敏感度负向关系越不显著。研究还发现:民营控股、董事长与总经理分离、高质量的信息披露能够显著抑制管理层薪酬操纵。
This paper studies the way the managerial power affects the pay performance sensitivity before and after removing the influences of earning management. We find that the compensation rigging has the characteristic of timing. The compensation rigging is more significant under the earning performance. The greater power of top managers, the lower sensitivity between pay and real performance, the higher sensi-tivity between pay and nominal earning performance. However, the sensitivity between pay and nominal losing performance doesn’ t show significant difference. This paper also finds the compensation rigging can be suppressed by non - state owned ownership structure, separated president of the board and general manager and stricter disclosure regulatory.
出处
《兰州商学院学报》
2014年第5期55-62,共8页
Journal of Lanzhou Commercial College
基金
国家社科基金青年项目(13CGL049)
北方工业大学优秀青年教师培养计划(14085)的阶段性成果
关键词
管理层权力
盈余管理
名义薪酬业绩敏感度
真实薪酬业绩敏感度
managerial power
earning management
nominal pay performance sensitivity
real pay per-formance sensitivity
