摘要
文章从关系专用性投资角度研究高管薪酬的有效性,认为如果考虑公司的关系专用性投资,高管薪酬业绩敏感性较低的现象将得以解释。文章实证检验了两个假设:(1)关系专用性投资显著降低了高管薪酬的业绩敏感性;(2)这种效应在信任水平低的地区更加明显。进一步控制内生性后,研究结论依然成立。文章丰富了以关系契约为基础的转型经济环境下的公司治理与薪酬契约的相关成果,也为上市公司设计有效的薪酬制度提供了新的思路与依据。
This paper studies the effectiveness of executive compensation from the perspective of relationship-specific investments and suggests that the relationship-specific investments can help to explain the lower executive pay-performance sensitivity. It empirically examines two hypotheses： firstly, the relationship-specific investments significantly reduce executive pay-performance sensitivity; secondly, this effect would be more obvious in regions with lower trust levels. After further controlling the endogenous problem, the conclusion is still robust. It enriches achievements of corporate governance and compensation contracts in a transition economy based on relationship contracts, and provides new ideas and evidence for how to design more effective compensation system in listed companies.
出处
《财经研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2014年第9期133-144,共12页
Journal of Finance and Economics
基金
国家自然科学基金项目"内部控制对关系专用性投资价值创造的传导机制研究"(71272220)
关键词
关系专用性投资
高管薪酬
业绩敏感性
地区信任水平
relationship-specific investment
executive compensation
pay-perform-ance sensitivity
regional trust level
