投资者认知、审计质量与公司价值被引量：28

Investor Recognition,Audit Quality and Firm Value

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摘要投资者认知是决定市场资源配置的重要因素,认知水平越高,公司价值越大。审计作为一种降低信息不对称的制度安排,能够影响公司信息传递,进而正向调节认知效应;审计还具有缓解代理冲突的功能,而代理成本与审计质量存在对应关系,因此审计质量也体现为对认知效应的负向调节。我国股市目前主要体现为后一种情况,表明审计提升公司价值的主要路径是缓解公司的代理冲突,公司对高质量审计的需求动机远比满足投资者信息需求的动机更为强烈。聘用大型事务所能够向市场投资者传递积极信号,对认知提升公司价值的效应有正向调节作用。审计模式选择需要考虑公司的信息传递特征,并与投资者对公司的认知水平相契合。 Investor recognition is the basis of learning market efficiency and resources allocation efficiency; it affects firm val- ue through information diffusion about the fundamentals. As an institutional arrangement for reducing agency cost and informa- tion cost, audit impacts firm value through information diffusion. By an empirical testing, we find that reducing agency cost is the basic function of audit in Chinese market. It embodies that the main mechanism of raising finn value through improving au- dit quality is reducing the agency problem in the firms. It is more important than meeting the information need of investors. We also find that hiring big auditors delivers a positive signal to the investors of the market. It has a positive moderate function on investor recognition effect. So choosing the models of auditing should take the characters of the information diffusion of the firm into account and fit the level of investor recognition of the firms.

作者雷光勇张英刘茉

机构地区对外经济贸易大学国际商学院

出处《审计与经济研究》 CSSCI 北大核心 2015年第1期17-25,共9页 Journal of Audit & Economics

基金国家自然科学基金项目(71472041) 对外经济贸易大学"211工程"四期项目对外经济贸易大学研究生科研创新基金重点项目(201304)

关键词投资者认知审计质量公司价值市场均衡信息不对称代理冲突审计费用公司治理结构 investor recognition audit quality finn value market symmetry information asymmetry agency conflict audit fees croporate governance structure

分类号 F239.43 [经济管理—会计学]

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