摘要
茶叶生产是控制茶叶质量的首要环节。茶农、茶商以及茶叶企业是茶叶生产和市场供给的主体,根据政府监管效力和市场信息情况,在种植、采摘、加工和销售各个环节具有不同行为表现。依据博弈理论,研究茶叶供给方与政府、茶叶生产企业之间的行为选择,探讨茶叶供给主体的行为动机,为政府制定产业政策和市场监管措施提供理论依据,从而促进茶产业健康发展。研究认为:有效的监管市场能够消除"柠檬市场"效应,提供有质量保障茶叶是理性选择;市场监管缺位情况下,提供无质量保障茶叶能够获取较高的市场收益。
The production process of tea is the key step in controlling the quality of tea. According to the different market information and supervision effectiveness of the government, tea planter, tea dealer and enterprises, who are the main body of tea production and market supply, have different behaviors in the course of tea-planting, tea-picking, tea-processing and tea-selling. This paper analyzes the act of different choice-making by the tea production enterprises and discusses the relationship between government and tea supplier based on the game theory, and provides a theoretical basis for government to formulate industrial policies and measures of market supervision, so as to promote the sound development of tea industry. The research shows that the rational choice of the tea supplier is to supply the tea of quality assurance under the effective market supervision however, in the absence of supervision, a higher market returns could be gained by providing the tea lacking of quality assurance.
出处
《安徽农业大学学报（社会科学版）》
2015年第1期55-59,共5页
Journal of Anhui Agricultural University:SOC.SCI.
基金
安徽省教育厅人文社会科学研究项目(SK2012B166:<安徽茶产业发展的实证研究>)
安徽农业大学哲学社会科学基金项目(2011zs05zd:<安徽茶产业发展的对策研究>)
关键词
茶叶供给
质量保障
主体行为
监管措施
the supply of tea quality assurance behavior of subject supervision measures
