摘要
本文在公平中性的供应商、公平关切的零售商和策略型与短视型顾客并存的供应链下,研究了零售商的最优定价与订货量及供应链的协调。研究发现,公平关切的零售商有提高产品价格和压低订货量的倾向;批发价契约难以实现供应链的协调;收益共享契约能实现供应链的完美协调。论文还讨论了零售商的公平关切程度和利润分享比例对供应商利润、零售商效用及供应链效用的影响。
Traditional research has always assumed that decision makers are completely rational and always pursue to maximize their own interest. Behavioral researches show that people focus on not only their own interest,but also others＇ when making decisions.When people find they receive unfair distribution of interest,they often sacrifice their own interest to influence others＇ in order to express their concerns about fairness.Fairness concerns are usually described by the utility function which introduces profit differences between channel members. In this paper,we describe the utility function of the retailer＇s fairness concerns by introducing a profit reference point. We assume that the equitable outcome for the fair-minded retailer is supplier＇s payoff. This study assumes that profit difference between decision makers will cause utility change. In another word,the retailer＇s utility increases when the retailer＇s profit is higher than the supplier＇s profit.The value of perishable products often decrease over time. Thus,product price usually decreases along with the time dimension.Some customers anticipate future sales and choose right purchase timing to maximize their expected surplus based on the current market information,such as price,demand,and inventory level. Other customers do not wait for sales as long as product price is lower than its valuation. Mr. Brad Anderson,the CEO of Best Buy（ a major electronics retailer in USA）,named the former customers as＂devils＂and the latter ones as＂angels＂.We consider a supply chain consisting of one supplier,one fair-minded retailer,and two types of customers. This study investigates the impact of the retailer＇s fairness concerns on optimal price and optimal ordering quantity. Results show that the retailer has tendency to improve price and lower ordering quantity under the wholesale price contract. The wholesale price contract can＇t coordinate the decentralized supply chain. The revenue sharing contract can perfectly coordinate the decentralized supply chain.Correspondingly,the range of the fair-minded retailer＇s sharing ratio parameter is provided. This study also discusses the impact of the supply chain＇s utility by the fairness degree,the sharing ratio of the retailer on the supplier＇s profit,and the retailer＇s utility. When the retailer＇s fraction of the supply chain＇s revenue is determined,the retailer＇s utility and the supply chain＇s utility decrease at the coefficient of the retailer＇s fairness concerns. When the coefficient of the retailer＇s fairness concerns is determined,the retailer＇s utility and supply chain＇s utility increase in the fraction of supply chain revenues kept by the retailer.
出处
《管理工程学报》
CSSCI
北大核心
2015年第1期89-97,共9页
Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(71171046
71201053)
国家科技支撑计划项目(2012BAH69F03)
江苏省普通高校研究生科研创新计划资助项目(CXLX12_0130)
关键词
顾客行为
公平关切
供应链协调
收益共享契约
customer behavior
fairness concern
supply chain coordination
revenue sharing contract
