摘要
农村水环境治理涉及的利益相关者众多、利益冲突复杂,有效协调各方利益和行动是提高治理成效的关键。探讨了政府、企业、村民和村委在水环境治理过程中的责任要求与行为关系,应用博弈论分析了政府—企业之间的不完全信息的动态均衡和政府—企业—公众之间的不完全信息的静态均衡。研究表明,企业积极治理水环境与公众参与、政府能力密切相关;政府切实查处污染的概率与公众维权的概率成反比,公众参与可有效提高企业的治理成效,降低政府的监督成本。
In the vast rural areas, water pollution became an important factor of threatening the normal production and life and the rural sustain- able development. Understanding the motivation of governance, promoting stakeholders coordination became one of the most important tasks of the rural water environment governance. To rationalize the action strategies of various stakeholders in the rural water environment governance, this paper ana- lyzed the behavior of major relevant stakeholder（government, township enterprise, village committees and villagers）based on the game theory. Then, based on villagers participation in governance or not to established the following game models：The incomplete information dynamic game model be- tween government and township enterprise, the incomplete information static game model of government, township enterprise and villagers. The results showed that the performance of rural water environment governance was closely related to the public participation and government ability, and the probability of the government accept report was inversely proportional to the probability of the public to report. Comprehensive analysis showed that setting up a three - level rural water environment management, coordination of the interests of relevant stakeholders and enhancement in the environ- mental awareness of government, township enterprise and villagers could improve the performance of rural water environment governance.
出处
《资源开发与市场》
CAS
CSSCI
2015年第3期321-326,共6页
Resource Development & Market
基金
国家科技重大专项课题"水环境产业发展战略与政策及其示范研究"(编号:2012ZX07601003)
福建省社科规划项目"城乡环境基本公共服务均等化路径研究"(编号:2012B130)
福建省软科学项目"水源地周边农村可持续发展路径与政策研究"(编号:2014R0007)
关键词
农村水环境
治理
利益相关者
博弈论
rural water environment
governance
stakeholders
game theory
