摘要
征迁矛盾的性质是利益博弈而非观念对抗。地方政府一方,有将土地资本化的冲动,村民一方,也有将土地货币化的意图,双方共享一套"发展"的话语。征迁矛盾难以化解的主要症结在于,地方政府与村民之间的博弈越来越往"无序化"逆向发展。如果只有村民和地方政府两个博弈主体,村民在双方"策略行为"的互动中将完全处于下风。中央政府和媒体作为第三方,预期角色为平衡者,平衡的结果应是抑制地方政府各种不合理的"策略行为",将双方纳入共同的规则之治中。但由于中央政府和媒体倾向于从绝对化的角度定义"出事",第三方的加入反而强化了民众的"策略行为"。地方政府和村民相继升级"策略行为",到最后难免有村民使用"边缘政策",从而引发双输的悲剧。
The nature of land-acquisition and house-demolishment is the redistribution of profits instead of the conflict of concept. The local government have the impulse of land capitalization, the villager also have the intentions of land monetization,both sides share a set of 'development' word. The main crux of the contradiction of land-acquisition and house-demolishment is that the game between local government and villager tend to disorder. If only the villagers and local government did participate in the game, the villagers in the interaction of 'strategy behavior' will be fully underdog. As a third party, the expected role of central government and the media is balancer. But as a result of the third party emphasize intensity of things instead of the ins and outs of things, treat accident and stability in the over-absolute and over-static view, the third party can not eradicate the'strategic behavior' of local government, instead, strengthen the 'strategic behavior' of masses. The local Government and villager successive upgrade 'strategy behavior', finally some villagers inevitably will use 'brinkmanship' that form the tragedy of lose-lose.
出处
《甘肃行政学院学报》
CSSCI
2014年第6期24-35,125,共12页
Journal of Gansu Administration Institute
