摘要
运用演化博弈理论,在能耗企业群体内以及能耗企业和政府之间建立了单群体和两群体的复制动态模型,分析了企业节能减排行为在群体内的扩散过程和制约因素,以及在企业和政府博弈过程中,企业的技术创新策略和要素替代策略如何随着政府的环境规制程度而演化。结果表明:自由市场竞争无法使企业节能减排行为在群体内得到全部扩散,完善的节能减排法律法规会加快企业节能减排行为的演化速度。为此提出了政府在促进企业节能减排上应采取的措施。
The evolutionary game theory is used to establish duplicate dynamic models of a single group and double groups inside the energy business groups, and between energy companies and the government. Then the analysis focuses on the diffusion process and the restricting factors of enterprise energy saving and emission reduction behavior within groups, as well as how the technological innovation strategy and factors substitution strategy of enterprises evolved with evolution of the government environment policy and regulation during the gaming process of government and enterprises. The results shows that free - market competition can not make the energy saving and emission reduction behaviors of enterprises spread within groups, while perfect energy savings and emission reduction law and regulations can accelerate the evolution speed of enterprises energy - savings and emission - reduction behaviors. Therefore, government is suggested to adopt some measures in improving the energy - savings and emission - reduction of enterprises.
出处
《西安石油大学学报（社会科学版）》
2015年第1期13-21,共9页
Journal of Xi’an Shiyou University:Social Science Edition
关键词
演化博弈
节能减排
复制动态模型
演化稳定
鹰鸽博弈
evolutionary game
energy -savings and emission -reduction
the duplicate dynamic model
evolution stable
game between the pigeon and the hawk
