摘要
本文基于中国健康与养老追踪调查(CHARLS)2011年的全国基线调查数据,采用Logit模型和分位数回归论证了新型农村社会养老保险中存在的逆向选择问题。研究发现在是否参加新农保决策中不存在逆向选择问题,而在新农保参加档次的选择中存在着显著的逆向选择问题,即预期寿命越长越可能购买新农保的最高档。新农保中的逆向选择问题可能增大个人账户基金缺口,影响城乡养老保险一体化的发展。针对这一问题,在政策改进过程中应该探索建立个人账户统筹基金,优化保险合约设计,强化新农保分散社会养老风险的功能,进一步完善我国城乡居民养老保险体系建设。
Utilizing data from China Health and Retirement Longitudinal Study （ CHARLS）, this paper analyzed the adverse selection in New Rural Social Pension Insurance. We adopted an empirical strategy composed of Logit Model and Quantile regression. Our study indicated that the adverse selection problem didn＇ t exist in the decision whether to participate to the new rural social pension insurance or not, but there was obvious adverse selection re- garding the choice of the grade of insurance. In other words, rural residents with better expectation of life expectancy were more likely to choose the highest grade of New Rural Social Pension Insurance. The adverse selection problem may result in widening shortfall of individual account, affecting the integration of the urban and rural social pension programs. To solve this problem, we should explore to set up an individual account pooling fund, optimize the design of the insurance contract, strengthen the risk spreading effect of the New Rural Social Pension Insurance, and further improve on the urban and rural residents social pension insurance system.
出处
《保险研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2015年第2期105-116,共12页
Insurance Studies
基金
2014年"中央高校基本科研业务费"(项目编号:JBK1407004)
西南财经大学博士研究生科研课题项目资助
