摘要
"权利寻租"会增加企业的管理成本,本文基于企业管理成本对控股主体、市场地位和经济环境等的动态响应机制,测度行政垄断和权利寻租引致的国有企业效率损失。实证分析结果和反事实对比仿真实验均表明:政治庇佑显著增加国有控股企业的管理成本,其管理效率约为民营控股企业的1/3。国有控股和集体控股企业的管理成本均具有刚性特征,对宏观经济和市场环境的变化不敏感;民营控股企业对经济环境的反应灵敏度是国有企业的5.5倍。市场垄断有助于降低民营控股企业的管理成本,却显著增加国有控股企业的管理成本。对企业外部市场环境的测度结果显示,2008年之后市场总体状况震荡向坏。所以,向民间资本开放国有经济核心垄断领域,在股权配置中发挥市场作用,是优化国有经济布局和结构的有效途径。
Rent-seeking of entitlements sharply increases firms＇ management cost. This paper measures the lost efficiency of the state-owned firms resulted from administrative monopoly and entitlements rent-seeking, based on the dynamic response mechanism of firms＇ management cost to stake holders, market status and economic environment. Empirical research and counterfactual comparative simulation experiments show that, political patronage significantly increases management cost of state-owned firms, their management efficiency is only about one-third of private firms. The management cost of state-owned firms and collective-owned firms shows rigidity and is insensitive to the change of macroeconomies and market environment, while the sensitivity of private firms to economic environment is 5.5 times of state-owned firms. Market monopoly can help reduce management cost for private firms, but has negative effect on state-owned firms. The measurement result of external market environment shows that, the overall market environment has become worse since 2008. Therefore, an effective way to optimize stated-owned economic layout and structure is to open up private capital in core monopoly areas and make it play a marketable role in stock equity allocation.
出处
《经济研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2015年第4期50-61,106,共13页
Economic Research Journal
基金
全国优秀博士学位论文作者专项资金资助项目(201304)"交互(分组)效应面板数据模型理论与应用研究"
国家自科基金面上项目(71271096)"平衡/非平衡交互效应面板SVAR模型的估计量与应用研究"
华中科技大学博士学位论文创新基金"企业失责行为的财务特征计量--利益相关者视角"的资助
关键词
股权性质
政治庇佑
行政垄断
管理成本
Ownership Property
Political Patronage
Administrative Monopoly
Management Cost
