摘要
主流经济学的委托代理理论难以解释员工针对组织的利他行为,而组织认同理论和身份经济学揭示的组织身份认同机制可以对此做出合理的解释,值得深入研究。笔者通过梳理整合相关理论和研究发现:在信息不对称条件下,组织身份认同能降低员工的认知决策成本并提升其幸福感,进而对员工行为发挥内在激励约束作用;组织身份具有的群体共享性和外部经济性使组织成员有动力相互监督激励约束各自行为以维护组织身份价值,从而使组织身份认同发挥对员工的外在协调激励作用。在此基础上我们得出以下基本结论:在信息不对称条件下,组织身份认同机制可以克服委托代理机制无法克服的员工机会主义行为问题,通过对员工行为发挥内外在激励约束作用来降低对员工的监督激励约束成本,因此比委托代理机制更有效。
The Principal-agent theory of the main stream economics fails to explain employees＇ altruistic behavior towards their organization, while organizational identification theory and identity economics can provide reasonable explanation. By integrating related theories and research, this study has the following findings： Organizational identification can reduce employees＇ cognition and decision cost, help enhance their subjective well-being, and thus have intrinsic motivation and regulating effect on their behavior. The externality of organizational identity makes organizational members monitor, motivate and constrain each other＇s behavior to maintain its value, and thus enables organizational identification to have extrinsic motivation and constraining effect on employee behavior. The following conclusion is drawn： under information asymmetry, organizational identification can overcome the unsolvable problem of employees＇ opportunistic behavior with the principalagent mechanism, also help reduce organizational monitoring, motivating and constraining cost by its intrinsic and extrinsic motivation and constraining effect on employee behavior, thus is a more effective mechanism than the principal-agent mechanism.
出处
《中央财经大学学报》
CSSCI
北大核心
2015年第5期77-81,共5页
Journal of Central University of Finance & Economics
基金
国家自然科学基金项目"外部CEO与原管理团队的管理认知融合过程与策略"(项目批准号:71402022)
关键词
组织身份
组织认同
激励
约束
委托代理理论
Organizational identity Organization identification Motivating Constraining Principalagent theory
