摘要
运用演化博弈理论分析了食品安全事件发生后消费者购买行为的演变趋势,研究结果表明:当国产食品在事件前就处于竞争劣势时,事件后消费者会逐渐倾向于购买进口食品直至进口食品完全占领国内市场;当国产食品在事件后还具备竞争优势时,无论生产者是否解决潜在的质量安全问题,消费者都会倾向于购买国产食品,但监管者加强监管力度会增进消费者福利、减少生产者福利;当事件前后国产食品由竞争优势转为竞争劣势时,如果监管力度较弱,消费者会逐渐倾向于购买进口食品,如果监管力度较强,则取决于事件前的消费者群体的购买行为和生产者群体的质量投入行为。
This paper applies evolutionary game theory to the analysis of the evolution trend of consumers＇ buying behaviors after the food safety incidents. The results show that when the domestic food is in the place of competitive disadvantage before the incidents,the consumers tend to buy imported food gradually and the imported food will completely occupy the domestic market. When domestic food still has the competitive advantage after the incidents,consumers tend to buy domestic food no matter whether domestic food producers have solved the potential food safety problems or not,however,regulators＇ strengthening force in supervision would enhance the consumer＇s welfare but reduce the producer＇s. When domestic food is transformed into competitive disadvantage from competitive advantage after the incidents,consumers will gradually tend to buy imported food if the supervision force is weak; on the other hand,if the supervision force is strong,it depends on the buying behavior of the consumer group and the quality investment behavior of the producer groups before the incidents.
出处
《华南农业大学学报（社会科学版）》
CSSCI
北大核心
2015年第2期84-92,共9页
Journal of South China Agricultural University(Social Science Edition)
基金
福建省自然科学青年基金项目(2013J05107)
关键词
食品安全
购买行为
质量投入
food safety consumer behavior investment on quality
