摘要
本文以2012年底前在中国创业板块上市的公司为研究对象,研究发现:(1)在IPO之前,财务绩效越好的公司,引入VC的意愿越弱,而且越不愿意引人多个VC以及经验VC;(2)在IPO之后,VC并不能更有效地帮助公司改善经营绩效;(3)在IPO时,资本市场不仅不会给予VC资助公司更高的估值,反而有可能贬损其市场价值。总之,在中国资本市场上VC未能有效地履行其基本职能——对创业型企业进行事前甄选和事后监管。
Based on the data of the listed companies in Shenzhen Growth Enterprise Market （ GEM）, our empirical study got some interesting implications about VCs in China. First, the better financial performance does a company enjoy, the less interest does it have to bring in some VC, especially two - or - more VCs or experienced VC. Second, after IPO, VCs do not effectively improve the company operating performance. Third, at the time of IPO, the capital market doesn＇t appreciate the value of the VCs, but rather depreciate the value of the VCs. In a word, VCs might not effectively perform their essential functions to screen and monitor the entrepreneurial firms in China.
出处
《金融研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2015年第4期192-206,共15页
Journal of Financial Research
基金
教育部人文社会科学研究项目(10YJA790224)
首都高校学科群建设项目<提升北京创新能力打造环渤海经济升级新引擎>
中国人民大学研究生科学研究基金项目(13XNH105)的资助
关键词
风险投资
甄选效应
监管效应
创业板上市公司
Venture capital, Screening effect, Monitoring effect, Listed companies on GEM
