摘要
为了将农户的"有限理性"纳入政府对农业非点源污染农户行为管理分析框架中,为政府治理非点源污染提供相应政策参考,在"有限理性"假设下,基于城乡统筹发展中农户行为的"集体表现"视角,运用"复制动态"方法,研究非点源污染控制的农户行为演化过程,分析政府在农户行为从初始状态到"演化稳定策略"过程中的作用。结果表明,农户"有限理性"使农业非点源污染控制的农户生产生活行为存在不确定性,但在与政府监督行为的长期博弈中,农业非点源污染控制的农户生产生活行为存在"演化稳定策略"。为促进这一稳定策略均衡,需要政府积极参与,并采用相关措施激励农户采用能使农业非点源污染排放达标的生产生活行为。
The study aims to bring famer＇ s ＂bounded rationality＂ into the government＇ s management frame of farmers＇ behavior about agricultural non-point source pollution and offer policy reference for the government＇s control of agricultural non-point source pollution. Based on farmer behavioral ＂collective performance＂ in urban and rural balancing development and used the method of ＂replicator dynamics＂, the author studied the evolutionary process of famers＇ behavior controlled by non-point pollution and analyzed the effect of government on famers＇ behavior process from original state to ＂replicator dynamics＂ under the assumption of ＂bounded rationality＂. The results showed that the famers＇ production activities and living behavior controlled by agricultural non-point source pollution became random under ＂bounded rationality＂, but in the long-term game with the government, this behavior had ＂evolutionary stable strategy （ESS）＂. The government should take active action to accelerate ESS and adopt measures to stimulate famers to take production activities and living behavior which can make discharge from agricultural non-point source pollution reach the standard.
出处
《中国农学通报》
2015年第17期279-284,共6页
Chinese Agricultural Science Bulletin
基金
四川省科技厅软科学项目"城乡统筹发展中农业非点源污染控制的农户行为研究--基于集体表现视角"(2013ZR0055)
关键词
城乡统筹
农业非点源污染
农户行为
演化博弈
urban and rural balancing
agricultural non-point source pollution
farmers＇ behavior
evolutionary game
