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行政垄断的经济学分析:根源、损失及破除 被引量:1

Economic Analysis of Administrative Monopoly: on its Root, Loss and Eradication
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摘要 经济垄断并不必然限制和排斥竞争,相反,在某种情况下,经济垄断还可能促进竞争的进一步扩展,并将竞争引向高级化。然而在行政垄断与市场竞争之间,找不到经济垄断与市场竞争这样的合题,行政垄断必将导致资源配置的低效率。规制经济学视角下,行政垄断根源于利益集团按自身利益最大化原则的博弈;制度经济学视角下,行政垄断根源于中国国有产权渐进变迁的路径依赖和交易成本的合理化安排。行政垄断与经济垄断一样,两者均会造成净剩余和"X-低效率"的一般损失,除此之外,在实践中,行政垄断还会造成相对于经济垄断的额外损失,包括妨碍经济自由、引致过度竞争、并发弱技术创新以及催生寻租等。降低或破除行政垄断,需要实现从行政主导到市场主导、从政企职能合一到分离、从行政垄断豁免到破除、从政治体制守旧到创新的转变。 Economic monopoly does not necessarily restrict or exclude competition. On the contrary, in some cases, economic monopoly may promote economic competition and take it to a higher level. However, it is impossible to find a symbiosis of economic monopoly and market competition between administrative monopoly and market competition. Administrative monopoly only leads to low-efficient resource configuration. From the perspective of regulation economics, the root of administrative monopoly lies in that interest groups always seek to maximize their interest. From the perspective of institutional economics, administrative monopoly has its root in path dependence of the gradual transition of China's state-owned property and the streamlined arrangement of transaction costs. Like economic monopoly, administrative monopoly also causes the general loss of net surplus and "X-low efficiency". In addition, in practice, in comparison with economic monopoly, administrative monopoly causes extra losses, including obstruction of economic freedom, excessive competition, weak technological innovation and rent-seeking, etc.. To reduce or break monopoly, we need to change from administration-oriented governance to market-oriented governance, separate enterprises from the government in terms of functions, break administrative monopoly rather than grant exemption to it, and realize the transformation from political conservatism to political innovation.
出处 《深圳大学学报(人文社会科学版)》 CSSCI 北大核心 2015年第3期116-122,共7页 Journal of Shenzhen University:Humanities & Social Sciences
基金 教育部人文社会科学重点研究基地重大项目"经济特区转型与中国模式研究"(项目号13JJD790043)
关键词 行政垄断 经济自由 过度竞争 弱技术创新 寻租 administrative monopoly economic freedom excessive competition weak technological innovation rent-seeking
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参考文献11

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