摘要
在我国现行的城市土地制度下,地方政府并不能自觉地成为以"市场"有效配置城市土地的制度供给主体,也不具有与中央政府一致的制度创新动力,由此造成的"非均衡性"制度供给是导致我国城市土地配置低效率的重要制度根源。同时,地方政府的"行为失范"也会导致城市土地配置不合理,并使其难以成为有效的"制度实施"主体。有鉴于此,地方政府应从城市土地使用权流转交易中退出,仅参与对城市土地的开发和利用。
Under the prevailing urban land institution, the local government would neither consciously be- come the main body of the institutional supply of market-oriented urban land allocation nor have the innova- tive impetus as the central government has, and the non-equilibrium of institutional supply caused by the a- bove is the important system root of inefficient Chinese urban land allocation. Simultaneously, the behavior anomie of the local government is the primary cause of the unduly urban land allocation and makes the local government unable to be an effective main body of institutional implementation. Accordingly, the local gov- ernment should withdraw from urban land usage right deal, but only participates in urban land development and utilization.
出处
《广东财经大学学报》
CSSCI
北大核心
2015年第4期53-61,83,共10页
Journal of Guangdong University of Finance & Economics
基金
国家社会科学基金项目(13XJL007)
中国博士后科学基金项目(2014M562197)
关键词
土地制度
城市土地配置
地方政府
制度行为
制度供给
land institution
urban land allocation
local government
institutional behavior
institutionalsupply
