摘要
在互联网金融创新冲击下,传统金融机构纷纷进行互联网化,很多商业银行悄然进军电子商务领域以对抗互联网电商巨头对金融业务的蚕食。运用博弈论分析金融互联网下商业银行涉水电子商务的动机及竞争的短期均衡状态。出于个体理性,银行在电商化行动中的占优策略是(进入,进入),电商促销活动的短期纳什均衡策略是(进行,进行)。并采用仿真方法模拟银行对电商化及其促销活动的反应以及产生的均衡结果,进一步说明了银行选择电商化策略的必然性,最后得出短期竞争均衡是各商业银行电商化投资存在过度竞争并将处于亏损状态。
Under the impact of internet financial innovation, traditional financial institutions made use of the In- ternet, and many commercial banks quietly entered the e-commerce in order to prevent oligarchs from eroding finan- cial services market. The authors analyze the motions and short-term competitive equilibrium of Commercial Bank involved in E-commerce under finance internet with game theory. For individual rationality, the dominant strategy of banks in the E-commerce is（ enter, enter）and short-term Nash equilibrium strategy of banks in the promotional ac- tivities of E-commerce is（conduct,conduct）. Then the authors simulate reaction and equilibrium of banks involved into E-commerce and promotional activities, which illustrates necessity of banks involved into E-commerce, and con- cludes that short-term competitive equilibrium of banks about E-commerce investment is excessive competition and in a loss status.
出处
《首都经济贸易大学学报》
2015年第5期29-36,共8页
Journal of Capital University of Economics and Business
基金
高校哲学社会科学研究重大项目"互联网金融产业的产业组织与政府管制研究"(2015ZDAXM005)
江苏省社会科学基金项目"江苏电子商务发展反向定制商业生态系统策略研究"(14GLC003)
高校哲学社会科学研究基金项目"中国规制转型与技术创新双重约束下的企业动态成长机制研究"(2014SJD025)
重庆市教育委员会人文社会科学项目"基于网络金融的重庆市小微企业成长的融资模式创新研究"(14SKL03)
关键词
金融互联网
银行电商化
非合作博弈
finance internet
bank into e-commerce
non-cooperative game
