摘要
2007年中国开始实行国有资本红利上缴政策,终结了国企只纳税不向政府上缴利润的历史。但是由于政府与国有企业内部人信息的不对称,国企内部人必然会产生道德风险问题,即将利润进行转移。运用委托代理博弈模型,分别考察了红利上缴前后,政府与企业内部人的行为。通过对模型最优解的分析,论证了国企红利上缴的必要性,发现在上缴比例扩大及企业内部人违规成本上升的情况下,政府收入成倒"U"型变化,同时国企内部人的利润转移程度呈现下降趋势;并且在国企红利征缴比例倍增的情况下,依据不同国企的经营状况,对不同行业征收不同的最优比例;另外降低企业内部人的薪资待遇,也能防止利润转移程度的扩大。
Since 2007, the payment of state-owned enterprises＇ profits of policy has been adopted, the history that state-owned enterprises only pay tax and needn＇ t pay interest has changed. The moral hazard of the state - owned enterprises internal management came from the asymmetric information between the government and the state-owned enterprises＇ internal management. The paper used the principal-agent model to analyse the behaviors of the government and the state-owned enterprises＇ management which is based on inspecting before and after divi- dend paid. The analysis implied the necessity of the payment of the profits and the relationship between dividend in- come and payout ratio is inverted U-shape. The government should constitute different payment ratio of state-owned enterprises＇ profits according to different industries. To reduce the enterprise managers＇ salary can also decrease the shifting profit.
出处
《首都经济贸易大学学报》
2015年第5期99-105,共7页
Journal of Capital University of Economics and Business
基金
国家社会科学基金重点项目"国企红利征缴比例倍增目标下的国资预算支出民生化研究"(14AGL007)
国家社会科学基金青年项目"公共资源收益合理共享视角下的国有企业红利分配研究"(13CGL024)
教育部人文社会科学项目"民生财政导向下的国有资本经营预算支出结构与绩效评价研究"(13YJA630007)
关键词
国企红利
道德风险
利润转移
委托代理博弈
state-owned enterprises＇ profits
moral hazard
shifting profit
principal agent game model
