摘要
应用有限理性假设下的演化博弈研究方法,引入额外收益分配系数、违约金的惩罚数额等因素构造产学研合作创新演化博弈模型并进行Matlab数值仿真模拟,判断策略的进化稳定性,分析产方和学研方的策略选择行为。研究结果表明:演化结果具有鲜明的路径依赖特征,取决于系统的初始状态,并与合作方从合作获得收益多少及收益能否得到公平分配和违约金的惩罚数额密切相关。因此,确定合理的违约金惩罚数额和分配系数的范围,才能保证产学研双方收敛于合作的稳定状态。
This paper studies the application of evolutionary game method under the assumption of bounded rationality,introduces the additional income distribution coefficient,the amount of liquidated damages penalties and other factors to construct a cooperative innovation evolutionary game model,carries out numerical simulation matlab,determines the evolutionary strategy stability,and analyzes the decision behaviors from the perspectives of producers and researchers. The results show that： the result has a distinct feature of evolutionary＂path dependence＂,which depends on the initial state of the system and is closely related to the income derived from cooperation with partners and a fair amount of punishment on liquidated damages. Therefore,a reasonable amount of punishment on liquidated damages and a rational allocation ratio,can ensure convergence to the steady state of both production and research cooperation.
出处
《科技管理研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2015年第16期100-105,114,共7页
Science and Technology Management Research
基金
河南省高等学校人文社会科学重点研究基地项目"产学研协同创新利益分配机制研究"(2013-JD-020)
河南省重点软科学(招标)项目"河南省构建产业(集群)技术创新体系对策研究"(132400411011)
河南省教育厅科学技术研究重点项目"产学研协同创新运行机制研究"(14A630034)
关键词
演化博弈
产学研合作
利益分配
复制动态
进化稳定性
evolutionary game
research cooperation
distribution of benefits
replicator dynamics
