摘要
本文整合了关于高管激励效应、"盘踞"和"掠夺"等机会主义行为以及控制权私人收益等相关研究成果,在深入剖析最优合约理论框架下股权激励研究的缺陷的基础上,从管理权力理论的视角,提出关于高管利用管理权力,选择机会主义行为攫取超额报酬的路径的新研究框架;相关经验证据显示了其合理性;并提出了未来相应的研究建议。
Based on the reviews on literatures of incentives effects, management entrenchment, management expropria- tion and private benefit in stock effects, the paper ponints out the problems in these literatures , which is under the research structure of optimal contract theory. Then from perspective of managerial power theory, the paper proposes a new research frame- work for how the management take advantage of opportunistic behaviors from managerial power for excess returns in stock incen- tives. The related empirical studies proves its reasonability. Finally, the paper gives some corresponding proposals for the future research.
出处
《经济体制改革》
CSSCI
北大核心
2015年第5期144-150,共7页
Reform of Economic System
基金
教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目"股权激励
兼并收购与公司业绩--管理权力视角下的案例与经验证据"(10YJC630370)
关键词
管理权力
最优合约理论
股权激励
机会主义行为
managerial power
optimal contract theory
stock incentives
opportunistic behavior
