摘要
文章以2010-2013年沪深两市的上市公司为对象,研究了董事长和总经理的变更对盈余管理程度的影响,并进一步探索了股东和董事会治理差异对两者关系的作用机制。结果表明:管理者在正常离职前的一年至两年内会进行盈余操纵,且正常变更前一年的盈余管理程度比变更前两年高。另外,股东和董事会治理水平的差异会显著影响管理者变更与盈余管理的关系,即股权集中度较低或董事会规模较小的情况下,管理者进行盈余管理的程度更大。
By taking the listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets from 2010 to 2013 as the object, this paper studies the impact of chairman and general manager＇ s turnover on earnings management, and further explores the mechanism of different shareholders and hoard governance on the relationship between chairman and general manager＇ s turnover and earnings management. The results show that the managers will manipulate earnings within a year to two years before their normal leave, and the earnings management level of the previous year is higher than that in two years ago. In addition, the difference of shareholders and board governance has a significant impact on the relationship between managers＇ turnover and earnings management, namely managers＇ earnings management level is higher in companies which have a lower ownership concentration or smaller board size.
出处
《华东经济管理》
CSSCI
北大核心
2015年第9期131-137,共7页
East China Economic Management
基金
国家自然科学基金项目(71172136)
教育部高等学校博士学科点专项科研基金项目(20120041110048)
关键词
管理者变更
盈余管理
股权集中度
董事会规模
managers＇ turnover
earnings management
ownership concentration
board size
