摘要
股东异质性表现为不同性质的股东对于公司治理的不同追求,进而呈现出不同的报酬率要求。在中国,国家股东与非国家股东性质上的差异以及由此导致的资本成本差异是实施混合所有制改革的财务基础。混合所有制的财务优势反映在通过不同性质股东之间的利益博弈实现资本成本的最低化。本文数据显示,国家股东依然是中国公司的第一大控股股东,对于中国企业的公司治理质量具有决定性作用;股东异质性会显著影响公司资本成本,由于政府职能与国有资本投资要求的混合以及政府管理经济手段的惯性,出现了国有资本成本低于非国有资本成本的现象:国家股东投入资本的资本成本还受到被投资行业性质的影响。在国家控股居主体地位的背景下,要求报酬率较高的非国家股东的加入势必带来资本成本更高的股权结构,从而产生与改革目标相违的"资本成本悖论"现象。这一现象将伴随国家股东职能的明晰、国有资本投资理性的提升以及中国企业公司治理的完善而逐渐消除,而这正是中国混合所有制改革趋于成功的过程。
Shareholder heterogeneity indicates different shareholders have different pursuit in corporate governance, and then have different required rate of return. In China, the difference between state shareholder and non-state shareholder and the cost of equity capital difference caused by it are the financial basis of the implementation of mixed ownership reform. The financial advantage of mixed ownership is to realize the minimum cost of capital through the interest game between different shareholders. Data in this paper shows, the state shareholder is still the largest controlling shareholder in Chinese companies, which plays a decisive role on Chinese corporate governance quality. Shareholder heterogeneity has a significant influence on the corporate cost of capital, but the cost of state-owned capital is lower than the cost of non-state-owned capital because of a mixture of the functions of the government and the state-owned capital investment requirements and the inertia of the government economic management. The cost of capital of state shareholder's investment is also affected by the nature of the industry invested. Under the control of the state holding, the participation of non-state shareholder with higher required rate of return will certainly bring capital structure with higher cost of capital, and then bring the "cost of capital paradox" phenomenon which is irreconcilable with the target of the reform. This phenomenon will be gradually eliminated, accompanied by the clarity of state shareholder's function, the promotion of state-owned capital investment rationality, as well as the perfection of Chinese enterprises' corporate governance, and this is the process which Chinese mixed ownership reform tends to be successful.
出处
《中国工业经济》
CSSCI
北大核心
2015年第9期129-144,共16页
China Industrial Economics
基金
国家社会科学基金一般项目"资本成本约束下混合所有制公司股权结构优化研究"(批准号15BGL066)
国家自然科学基金面上项目"资本成本约束下公用事业企业政府规制研究"(批准号71572117)
北京市社会科学基金重点项目"资本成本测算及其应用领域研究"(批准号15JGA010)
关键词
股东异质性
资本成本
混合所有制
资本成本悖论
shareholder heterogeneity
cost of capital
mixed ownership
cost of capital paradox