摘要
本文研究了城市再生水BOT项目特许经营权竞标机制设计问题.运用激励机制设计思想建立了满足个体理性和激励相容约束的拍卖模型,并通过求解此模型得到了最优的拍卖机制.最优拍卖机制不仅能诱导企业真实地披露自己的成本类型,还能提高政府对社会资源的配置效率.
In this paper, we study the mechanism design for franchise bidding in urban reused water BOT project. The model of bidding is established based on the incentive mechanism,which is incentive compatible and individual rationality. Then the optimal biding mechanism is obtained by solving the model. The optimal bidding mechanism not only can induce the enterprises to disclose their true cost type, but also can improve the governments＇ allocation efficiency.
出处
《数学杂志》
CSCD
北大核心
2015年第5期1269-1274,共6页
Journal of Mathematics
基金
国家自然科学基金资助(71071119
71231007
61173061)
国家哲学社会科学基金资助(12BGL027)
湖北省教育厅项目资助(Q20121903
14G289)
湖北水事研究中心项目资助(2013B007)
关键词
BOT
特许经营权
歧视价格拍卖
激励机制
BOT
franchise bidding
discriminatory auction
incentive mechanism
