摘要
本文构建一个简单的企业集团组建模型,利用讨价还价理论,分析企业集团组建过程中的利益分配问题。分别利用Nash讨价还价理论和Rubinstein讨价还价理论,得出企业集团组建中的各种利益分配形式以及使其成立的条件,其中重点分析了不同成员对讨价还价过程的耐受程度。最后给出算例验证其可行性。
The formation of enterprise groupshave always been animportant part in the research ofindustrial organization.Based on the game theory and experimental economics, scholars analyzed the causes of formation of enterprise group, the process of formation of enterprise groupand various policiestoensure the formation of enterprise group. Current literature lacks of research on the distribution of benefits among members after enterprise groups are formed.Thus, the theme of our paper is the distribution of benefits among members after enterprise groupshave been established. In this paper,our main research toolsare the Nash bargaining theory and the Rubinsteinbargaining theory. Before analyzing the distribution of benefits among membersin the process offormation of enterprise group, some principles must begiven：（a） after the formation of enterprise group, their profit is greater than sum of profit of both forms when it comes to its own profit;（b） the assigned profit of each enterprise cannot be lower than their own profit;（c） the form of bargaining isa turning process, and there is a tolerance level on both sides.In the process of enterprise group formation,the distribution of benefits among members can be abstracted as the bargaining model.Bargaining theory has been a very perfect theory system, which is animportant tool to solve the problem of profit distribution.Nash bargaining theory is uses mathematical analysis based on the axiomatic system. However, interactive Rubinstein bargaining is more common and more realistic situationin the real life. In the distribution of benefit among members, companies will need to propose their own scheme, and confront the long bargaining process, until getting a distribution form, which iseventually satisfied by both sides.Here, we assume that Enterprise 1 firstly proposesa scheme （π0^＊-x,x）, and Enterprise 2 decides whether to accept the schedume. If Enterprise 2accepts the scheme, the bargaining process ends; if Enterprise 2 does not accept the scheme, it will propose a new scheme in the second stage, and Enterprise 1 decides whether to accept the new scheme. If Enterprise 1 accepts it, the bargaining process ends.If Enterprise1 does not accept it, it will proposea new scheme in the third stageuntil receivinga distribution form, which iseventually satisfied by both sides.Since two sides have the tolerance degree in the bargaining process, we assume that Enterprises 1 and 2own the discount factor δ 1 and δ2 respectively, and own respective profits π1^＊ and π2^＊, when there is noformation of enterprise group, which is the lower limit of acceptable solutions.Assume that π0^ ＊≥ π1^＊≥ π2^＊, by the means of analyzing the finite condition, the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the game is solved.After introducing Rubinstein bargaining degree of tolerance in the bargaining process among members, the model is solved using the backward induction method, and the subgame perfect Nash equilibriums are obtained. In conclusion, the benefits depend onthe inherent benefits and the degree of tolerance. A separate decision is impossible. In China, the study of benefitdistribution of enterprise groups has strong practical implications. The modelcan be applied to many areas.In real life, a lot of things cannot be completed by anindividual alone, or the cost is higherand the proof is less if those things done individually.Therefore, cooperation with others is necessary in order to solve problems and increasethe total revenue.At this time, we will face an important questionon how to increase income distribution between different members. This article provides a quick allocation method. Under different levels of tolerance, by the means ofthe Nash bargaining theory and the Rubinstein bargaining theory, we analyzed the distribution of benefits among members participating in a negotiation process. Firstly, a model of formation of industrial group is introduced. Then, based on thebargaining theory, the problem of benefit distributionin the process of formation of industrial group is studied. Based onthe Nash bargaining theory and Rubinsteinbargaining theory, different distributions and their established conditions are given, and tolerance degree measuresof bargaining processare studied. Finally, some numeric examplesare given.
出处
《管理工程学报》
CSSCI
北大核心
2015年第4期140-144,共5页
Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management
基金
国家社科基金西部资助项目(09XJL008)
教育部人文社会科学研究资助项目(09YJC790281)
