摘要
构建基于估值调整协议的风险投资机构和创业企业权益分配模型,研究了风险投资机构最优固定权益分配比例及其影响因素,风险投资机构和创业企业或有控股权的充分条件。结果表明,若要实现最优固定权益比例,风险投资机构和创业企业之间的估值分歧不能过大。风险投资机构获得的最优固定权益比例,除了与投融资双方工作效率和努力程度有关,还与风险投资机构和创业企业估值分歧和风险投资实现双赢的可能性有关,实现双赢的可能性越大,风险投资机构获得的最优固定权益比例越大,而估值分歧与风险投资机构获得的最优固定权益比例的关系受双赢出现的概率影响,当实现双赢可能性大,随着估值分歧增大,风险投资的最优固定权益比例随之增多,以补偿估值失败而失去部分权益的风险,当实现双赢可能性小,随着估值分歧增大,风险投资机构的最优固定权益比例随之减少,以实现对企业家的有效激励。当创业企业努力创新使得盈利水平超过估值调整阀值时,创业企业将拥有企业绝对控股权,但若风险投资机构蒙受损失较大,风险投资机构在估值调整前获得企业的绝对控股权以弥补承担的风险。若要风险投资机构始终不获得绝对控股权,则需要创业企业家非资金的贡献大,且风险投资机构承担的损失小。
Valuation adjustment agreement is one of the types of financing contracts used to solve the information asymmetry problem between venture capitalists and venture enterprises. When venture capitalist and venture enterprise cannot agree to enterprise valuation, investors and financiers often set an enterprise＇ future performance target and adjust the benefits of both sides based on the actual business performance. This kind of financing method can help protect the rights and interests of the venture capitalist. Because of these benefits, the Chinese venture capital industry has commonly adopted the valuation adjustment agreement.According to the equity allocation process of valuation adjustment agreement equity and the double moral hazard, the equity allocation model between venture capitalist and venture enterprise was built to study the venture capitalist optimal fix equity ratio, its influencing factors, and the necessary conditions of right for contingent controlling stake and absolute controlling stake. This study assumes that valuation adjustment valve value has not been achieved and venture capitalist may have ideal gain. Based on these assumptions, our analysis results show that that in order to achieve the optimal proportion of fixed interest, valuation differences between venture capitalist and venture enterprise cannot be too big. Venture capitalist＇ optimal fixed equity ratio is affected by the work efficiency and effect, which is related to the part of the adjusted equity ratio and the possibility of achieving a win-win situation. The more likely the win-win situation occurs, the greater the optimal fixed equity ratio can be obtained by venture capitalists. The relationship between valuation differences and the optimal proportion of fixed interest is influenced by the win-win probability. As the valuation differences increase between venture capitalists and entrepreneurs, venture capitalists＇ optimal fixed equity ratio increases in order to reduce the risk of losing partial equity ratio which can cause valuation failures. When the possibility of achieving a win-win is small, the valuation differences between venture capitalists and entrepreneurs will increase, and venture capitalists＇ optimal fixed equity will fall in order to realize the effective incentive for entrepreneurs. Depending on the equity allocation proportion obtained by venture capitalist, venture capitalists may appear having little value to the entrepreneurial company, the venture capitalist, and the enterprise. Entrepreneurial enterprises have absolute control over venture capitalists when their innovation exceeds the standards set by the valuation adjustment. If a venture capitalist＇s losses reaches a certain level, it can make more than half the proportion of equity ratio before the valuation is adjusted to compensate for risk. If a venture capitalist doesn＇t have absolute control, entrepreneurs need to work hard, and the venture capitalist bears small potential loss.
出处
《管理工程学报》
CSSCI
北大核心
2015年第4期186-193,共8页
Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(71173169)
中央高校基本科研专项资金项目(2013G6233018)
关键词
估值调整协议
双向道德危害
最优固定权益分配
或有控股权
valuation adjustment agreement
double moral hazard
optimal fix equity allocation
contingent controlling stake
