摘要
委托代理理论的授权问题,在授权的结构和激励效应方面有许多结论;在多代理人条件下,研究平行授权和顺次授权的激励问题,并在异质性代理人和信息不完备条件下,研究顺次授权模式的信息甄别问题,得到了良好的结论。
Delegation derived from＂Principal-agent＂theory,many conclusions are obtained in terms of structure of delegation and incentive of delegation. Under conditions of multiple agents,this paper study＂parallel delegation＂and＂sequential delegation＂and their incentives. Under conditions of heterogeneous agents and incomplete information,this paper study＂parallel delegation＂and its＂information Screening＂; and this paper get some good conclusions.
出处
《江西科学》
2015年第5期631-634,655,共5页
Jiangxi Science
关键词
授权
组织结构
信息甄别
delegation
organization structure
information screening
