摘要
航空武器装备承制商的良好信用是获得跟军方合作机会的基础,建立与维护信用需要付出一定成本,权衡信用成本与所得收益是承制商与军方合作并守信的重要条件.分析了航空武器装备承制商信用成本与收益关系以及承制商守信与失信条件,将博弈论运用到承制商与军方合作条件的研究中,通过建立航空武器装备承制商博弈守信和失信收益的模型,证明了在航空武器装备采办过程中考虑信用成本的双方合作条件能够制约承制商失信行为,为双方带来更多的收益.
The good credit of aviation weapon equipment supplier is basic to obtain coop- eration opportunities with military. To establish and maintain credit need to pay a certain cost. Weighing the credit cost and proceeds is important conditions for supplier cooperate with military and trustworthy. The article analyzes the relationship between credit cost and proceeds of aviation weapon equipment supplier, also analyzes supplier trustworthy and lose trust of conditions. Game theory is applied to research the cooperation conditions of supplier and military. To establish, the model that aviation weapon equipment supplier game trustwor- thy and lose trust proceeds. It prove supplier can be restricted dishonesty acts by consider the cooperation conditions of credit cost during aviation weapon equipment acquisition, and bring more proceeds for both sides.
出处
《数学的实践与认识》
北大核心
2015年第20期1-7,共7页
Mathematics in Practice and Theory
基金
国防基金(51327020104)
关键词
航空武器装备承制商
信用成本
博弈
信用评价
aviation weapon equipment supplier
credit cost
game
credit evaluation
