摘要
随着客运能力的不断增加和铁路客票系统的升级完善,旅客对于铁路客票预售期是否能够延长的问题更加关注。最近,铁路总公司为方便广大旅客出台了延长客票预售期的新规。新规虽然为旅客带来了便利,但是同时也存在一些问题。该文通过构建铁路总公司与旅客的动态博弈模型,分析铁路总公司与旅客这两个局中人之间的动态博弈行为,运用逆向归纳法得出子博弈精炼纳什均衡,并证明其存在性。结果表明:铁路总公司采取预售期延长的策略是一种帕累托改进,因此,旅客采取提前购票可以更好的满足对火车票具有刚性需求的中长途旅客的出行,同时也有利于铁路资源的优化配置。
With the increasing capacity of passenger and the improvement of railway ticket system, whether railway ticket pre-sale period should be extended has aroused much public attention. For the convenience of visitors,railway corporation issued new regulations to extend the ticket pre-sale period recently. Although this policy brings convenience for travelers, but it also has some problems. In this paper, we analyze the behavior between the railway corporation and passengers by constructing the dynamic game model. Then we obtain sub-game refining Nash equilibrium by using backward induction, and prove its existence. This paper shows that the extended pre-sale period strategy is a Pareto improvement, and thus tickets booking strategies in advance can better meet the rigid demand for tickets of long-distance passenger travel, and improve the allocation of railway resources.
出处
《科技创新导报》
2015年第22期24-25,共2页
Science and Technology Innovation Herald
基金
国家自然科学基金(NO:71401003)
教育部人文社会科学青年项目(NO:14YJC630114)
关键词
铁路总公司
旅客
预售期延长
动态博弈
帕累托改进
Railway corporation
Passengers
Booking duration
Dynamic game
Pareto improvement
