摘要
本文立足于国有企业高级管理层普遍存在的道德风险现状,经过深入分析调查,发现我国国有企业均或多或少的存在高层管理者的短视行为及侵害利益相关者既得利益的隧道行为。在分析了声誉机制对抑制高管机会主义行为并对依法经营的企业予以经济回报的基础上,通过相关声誉回归模型的建立,试图证明声誉效应能够对国有企业经理人的利己行为形成一种约束机制,借以帮助企业显著提升公司价值,有效打破进入壁垒,最终收获顾客忠诚度;此外,在声誉效应对企业财务绩效发挥正向作用的同时,探寻企业经理人的机会主义行为是否充当中介,即高管的机会主义行为是否在声誉效应对企业财务绩效的影响过程中发挥中介作用,以期为国有企业有效控制道德风险提供理论与技术的支持。
Based on the universal presentation of moral hazard from senior management in the state- owned enterprises,this paper found,through in- depth analysis,there exists more or less short- sighted behavior or tunnel behavior of high- level managers in the state- owned enterprises in our country. On the analysis of the reputation mechanism on curbing executives＇ opportunism behavior and prizing economic return,through modeling the relevant reputation regressions,the article tries to prove that the reputation effect can selfish the behavior of managers from state- owned enterprises to form a kind of constraint mechanism,so as to help enterprises to greatly increase the value of the company,effectively break the barriers to entry and own the customer loyalty; in addition,the enterprise managers＇ opportunism behavior at the same time,acts as an intermediary variable,namely the opportunism behavior of executives in the reputation effect plays a mediating role in the process of corporate financial performance,which helps to provide theory for state- owned enterprises to effectively control the moral risk and supply technical support.
出处
《工业技术经济》
北大核心
2015年第11期130-138,共9页
Journal of Industrial Technological Economics
关键词
声誉效应
机会主义行为
企业绩效
中介效应
声誉评价
reputation effect
opportunism behavior
enterprise performance
the mediation effect
reputation assessment
