摘要
本文综合考虑价格管制和现行的医保支付政策,研究制药企业创新投入和药品定价的协同决策问题,探讨价格管制和医保支付政策对制药企业创新投入和创新药定价的交互作用机制。研究表明,制药企业定价机制的选择受到管制价格和医保支付政策的双重影响,特别地,当医保支付比例较高时,价格不能作为药品的创新水平的信号,适当降低医保支付有助于控制制药企业创新中的机会主义行为;价格管制对制药企业创新投入的作用受到医保支付政策和企业自身创新能力的共同影响;价格管制并非总是降低企业的创新激励,当医保支付比例较高时,价格管制可在一定程度上纠正创新投入配置的扭曲,提高创新能力中等的制药企业的创新激励。
This paper studies collaborative decisions on innovation investment and pricing of a pharmaceutical firm in a complete competitive market, considering price regulation and medicare policy simultaneously. We explore interactions between price regu- lation and medicare payment on the firm＇ s innovation investment and pricing mechanisms. The results are as follows ： first, new medicine＇ s pricing mechanisms are determined by the ceiling price and the medicare pohey jointly, especially the price of the new medicine is not able to indicate its innovation level if the medicare payment is low; second, lowering the medicare payment appropriately will reduce the firm＇ s opportunistic behavior in innovation; third, impacts of price regulation on pharmaceutical firm＇ s innovation investment are influenced by the medicare policy and firm＇ s own innovation ability collectively; and finally, price regulation does not necessarily result in innovation underinvestment and it might correct the distortion of innovation invest- ment allocation and enhance innovation investment of the pharmaceutical firm with medium innovation ability if the medicare pay- ment is high.
出处
《科研管理》
CSSCI
北大核心
2015年第12期120-128,共9页
Science Research Management
基金
国家社会科学基金(15BGL074
2015.06-2018.12)
国家自然科学基金(71071080
2011.01-2014.12)
关键词
价格管制
医保支付政策
创新投入
定价机制
制药企业
price regulation
medicare policy
innovation investment
pricing mechanism
pharmaceutical firms
