期刊文献+

独立许可条款下竞争性专利联盟累积创新效应比较研究 被引量:4

A Comparative Study on Cumulative Innovation Effect of Competitive Patent Pools with Independent license terms
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摘要 由于技术标准间竞争加剧,在高新技术产业内形成了基于不同技术标准的多个竞争性专利联盟并存的格局。此外,随着对专利联盟垄断性审查的加强,同时为了更好地保护联盟内企业利益,鼓励其创新,很多联盟采用了独立许可条款。为此,运用动态博弈理论分别构建无独立许可条款和有独立许可条款下竞争性专利联盟累积创新效应的分析模型,对阻碍性专利的创新效应进行比较研究。结果表明:竞争性专利联盟创新效应受独立许可条款、专利类型、专利联盟技术标准间差异化程度、联盟内企业所持有的必要专利数量等因素影响,具有复杂性。但总体上,竞争性专利联盟可降低专利许可费,促进专利的使用,有利于提高社会福利,促使企业增加研发投入,鼓励企业创新。 Competitive patent pools based on different technical standards have been appearing in high technique industry as competitions among technical standards are becoming intensive.More and more competitive patent pools have used independent license terms in order to encourage the firms belong to them to innovate and protect their benefits.In this paper,we have developed two mathematical models of cumulative innovation effect of competitive patent pools with and without independent license terms to comparative study with the help of dynamic game theory and stochastic analysis.After then,result shows:generally competitive patent pools are able to lower patent licensing fees,promote patent application and increase social welfare as well as encourage firms to innovate,however cumulative innovation effect of competitive patent pools are influenced by multi-factor,for example patent type,degree of differentiation among patent pools,allocation proportion of patent licensing fees and so on,so specifically cumulative innovation effect of competitive patent pools appear complicated.
出处 《科技进步与对策》 CSSCI 北大核心 2016年第1期1-8,共8页 Science & Technology Progress and Policy
基金 国家自然科学基金面上项目(71373137)
关键词 竞争性专利联盟 创新效应 独立许可条款 阻碍性专利 专利类型 Competitive Patent Pools Innovation Effect Independent License Terms Blocking Patents Type of Patent
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参考文献23

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二级参考文献52

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