行动理由中的知识与理解被引量：4

Knowledge and Understanding in Reasons of Action

下载PDF

导出

摘要行动的"愿望/信念"模型主张行动的理由只能是行动者的意向状态。事实型理由与信念型理由的区分突破了这一观念,主张理由也可以是外部世界的事实。刻画两种理由的差异需要考虑行动理由能够提供怎样的理解,以及是否能够提供知识。事实型理由的丹西观点表明,理由的适当性评判与理由命题的真假判定之间存在相对独立性;即便理由命题不提供知识,我们也仍能获得关于理由适当性的理解。而析取主义观点则主张,只有当理由命题提供知识,才是真正的以事实作理由。这要求把行动理解为对事实的理性回应。 The Desire-Belief model claims that reasons of action could be merely agent＇s intentional states. However, that model though widely accepted has been criticized by the distinction between （F）-type and （B）-type reasons, which argues that reasons can be external facts rather than any inner states. The concerns upon knowing and understanding are necessary in order to characterize the distinction. Jonathan Dancy＇ s conception of （F）-type reason identifies some independence of propriety from factivity of reasons. Even though it could not provide knowledge, propositions of reasons may also let us understand why it is appropriately acting for those reasons. On the contrary, the disjunctivist would argue that it is necessary to provide knowledge for taking facts as reasons, in which action has to be understood as rational responses to facts.

作者徐竹

机构地区中国科学院大学人文学院

出处《山东大学学报（哲学社会科学版）》 CSSCI 北大核心 2016年第1期146-153,共8页 Journal of Shandong University(Philosophy and Social Sciences)

关键词理由理解知识论行动哲学 Reasons Understanding Epistemology Philosophy of Action

分类号 B089 [哲学宗教—哲学理论]

引文网络
相关文献

参考文献20

1Derek Parfit, "Reasons and Motivation", in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes 1997, 71, p. 99.
2Maria Alvarez, Kinds of Reasons: An e.ssay in the philosophy of action, Oxford:Oxford University Press, 2010, p. 37.
3Jennifer Hornsby, "A Disjunctive Conception of Acting for Reasons", in Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge, A. Haddock and F. Macpherson ( ed. ). Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2008, pp. 244 - 261.
4Peter Strawson, "Truth", in Logico-Linguistic Papers. London:Methuen & Co, 1971, p. 196.
5I.inda Zagzebski, "Recovering Understanding", in Knowled,qe,Truth, and Duty, Oxford: Oxford University Press,2001, p. 245.
6Jonathan Kvanvig, The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding,New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003, p. 190.
7Donald Davidson, Essays on Actions and Events. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980, pp. 3-4.
8John Hyman, "How Knowledge Works",Philosophical Quarterly, 1999, 49(197), p. 444.
9Jonathan Dancy, Practical Reality, New York, Oxford University Press, 2000, pp. 128-129.
10Jonathan Dancy, Practical Reality, New York: Oxford University Press, 2000, p. 132.