摘要
从制度经济学看,控股股东与上市公司发生的关联交易名义上属于买卖的交易,但实质上属于管理的交易或限额的交易,有着性质上非公允的必然;从公司治理结构看,国有股的不流通、绝对控股以及中小股东对控股股东的制衡存在明显的供给不足,导致了控股股东通过非公允关联交易从上市公司转移利益的必然。规范关联方交易的有关法规不能保证关联交易的公开、公平和公正,为非公允关联交易的发生提供了可能。对非公允关联交易进行监管时,应完善公司治理结构和有关法规,从根源上控制非公允关联方交易。
From the view of system economics, Related party' s transaction between listed company and controlling shareholder is belonged to management transaction or limited transaction ,although it is buying and selling transaction in the nominance. From the view of corporate governance, the share' s structure is unreasonable , the share of government can' t circulate ,the restrict of little shareholders to controlling shareholder is not sufficient. This will result in the certainty of controlling shareholder transfer treasure from the listed company. Our country' s laws on related party' s transaction can't promise public , fair and just. This will result in possibility of unfair related party's transaction. In order to solve the problem , we must revise corporate governance structure, laws and controll the connected transaction from the source.
出处
《财会通讯（下）》
北大核心
2004年第3期46-49,共4页
Communication of Finance and Accounting
关键词
非公允关联方交易
必然性
可能性
监管
unfair related party' s transaction , certainty and possibility, control .
