摘要
信息披露质量的高低对中小企业债务融资有着直接影响,高质量的信息披露可以减轻中小企业和利益相关者之间的信息不对称程度,信息不对称程度的降低有利于中小企业融资,缓解中小企业融资难的问题。本文以2011—2014年深交所中小企业板的上市公司为研究对象,通过建立回归模型检验了信息披露质量对银行债务融资约束和商业信用融资约束的影响,并引入市场风险因素进一步探讨,研究发现:(1)提高信息披露质量能显著降低企业的债务融资约束,信息披露质量越高的公司越容易获得银行借款和商业信用。(2)相比面临市场风险小的企业而言,信息披露质量对市场风险大的企业债务融资约束影响更为显著。
Information disclosure quality has a direct effect on debt financing of the small and medium - sized enterprises （SME） ： high quality disclosure alleviates the information asymmetry between SME and their stakeholders while decreased information asymmetry benefits SME in financing. With the listing companies in the Shenzhen SME board from 2010 to 2012 as samples, the influence of information disclosure quality on bank debt financing constraints and commercial credit financing constraints is tested via an established regression model, which is further studied with market risk factors involved. The results show that information disclosure quality improvement can sig- nificantly reduce enterpriseg debt financing constraints, and the companies with high disclosure quality have easier access to bank loans and commercial credit; and that compared with the enterprises which are faced with low market risks, information disclosure quality has a more significant influence on the debt financing constraints of the enterpri- ses which are faced with high market risks.
出处
《山东财经大学学报》
2016年第1期109-117,共9页
Journal of Shandong University of Finance and Economics
关键词
信息披露质量
中小企业
债务融资约束
市场风险
information disclosure quality
small and medium - sized enterprise
debt financing constraint
market risk
