摘要
本文在随机市场需求的一般情形下,同时引入零售商和供应商的公平偏好,以Nash讨价还价为博弈框架,研究公平偏好对收益共享契约协调性的影响,并进行数值模拟分析,结果表明:只有公平偏好强度满足相应条件时,公平偏好才能使收益共享契约实现供应链的协调;当收益共享契约协调供应链时,公平偏好虽然不会改变契约参数以及节点企业最优决策和利润,但是会改变供应链中各主体的预期和效用,因而改变了供应商和零售商协调供应链的心理意愿。
In the general condition of stochastic demand, this paper studies the effect of the fairness preference on the coordination extent of the revenue sharing contract and makes the numerical simulation by introducing the fairness prefer- ence of both the retailor and the supplier into the frame of Nash bargaining. It is found that the revenue sharing contract can coordinate the supply chain only when the fairness preference meets relevant constraints; when the revenue sharing contract can coordinate the supply chain, the fairness preference does not change the contract parameters, the optimal de- cision making and the profits of the node enterprises, while it will change the expectations and the utilities of the node enterprises, which changes retailors and the suppliers＇ psychological intentions to coordinate.
出处
《商业研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2016年第2期162-169,共8页
Commercial Research
基金
国家自然科学基金项目
项目编号:71102165
关键词
Nash讨价还价
公平偏好
收益共享契约
行为供应链
Nash Bargaining
fairness preference
revenue sharing contract
behavioral supply chain
