摘要
不确定性是影响不完备性契约的重要因素。现有研究多是在确定性框架下进行的,文章从不确定性的角度,研究董事会替换CEO的影响因素。实证结果表明,董事会规模和独立性的变化率与CEO替换有相关关系,但影响方向却不一致,说明董事会作用机制的复杂性。当董事会独立性变动更大时,CEO替换的可能性更小。股权制衡度变化是引起CEO替换的重要因素,盈余管理与CEO替换之间有正向相关的关系。收入波动与董事会之间有正向相关关系但不显著,系统性风险与CEO替换有显著负相关关系。总体说来,实证结果显示在替换CEO的过程中,业绩并非主要因素,企业内部权力博弈是CEO替换的决定性因素。
Uncertainty is an im portant factor to affect incomplete contracts. Most existing studies are within the framework of certainty,while the influencing factors of CEOs’ substitutions among the board is studied with the perspective of uncertainty in the paper. The empirical results show that there is a correlative relationship between the variable rates of board size and independence and the CEOs’ substitutions,but the influencing directions of size and independence are not consistent. The inconsistent directions indicate the complexity of the mechanism for the board of directors. When the rate of independence for the board is increasing,the possibility to exchange the CEO is decreasing. The variance of Equity Balance Degree is an important factor to lead CEOs’ substitutions,and there is a positive correlation between the control of earning and CEO’s substitution. The positive correlation between the income fluctuation and the board of directors is not obvious,but there is a significantly negative correlation between the systemic risks and the CEO’s substitution. Overall,the empirical results prove that the company performance is not the main factor affecting CEOs’ substitution,but the internal power game is decisive factor.
出处
《技术经济与管理研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2016年第2期3-7,共5页
Journal of Technical Economics & Management
基金
国家自然科学基金面上项目(71472001)
