摘要
收集我国民营上市公司的样本,运用代理成本理论,实证研究家族管理对民营企业债务融资的影响,发现家族管理对债务融资的影响支持"阻碍作用"观点,不支持"促进作用"观点。当民营企业所在地区的制度环境较好时,家族管理阻碍了债务融资,反之则没有显著影响;当企业实际控制人自利倾向较高时,家族管理可以在一定程度上促进债务融资,反之则会阻碍债务融资。进一步的研究表明,当制度环境好且自利倾向低时,家族管理对民营企业的债务融资发挥了显著的"阻碍作用"。
Based on the theory of agency cost, the paper studies the influence of family management on the debt financing of private enterprises. The paper collects the data of Chinese private listed companies, and the results are as follows ： For all the private listed companies, the empirical research results of the relationship between family management and debt financing of private enterprise do not support the ＂promotion effect＂, but support ＂block effect＂ ; In the area of good institutional environment, the relationship between family management and debt financing supports ＂block effect＂, but in areas with poor institutional environ- ment, the relationship is not significant; For the enterprise of high self-interest tendency, family management plays a partial ＂promotion effect＂ on debt financing, but for the enterprise of low self-interest tendency, family management has a ＂block effect＂ on debt financing; Further studies show that for samples of good institutional environment and low tendency of self-interest, family management plays a significant ＂block effect＂ on the debt financing of private enterprises.
出处
《广东财经大学学报》
CSSCI
北大核心
2016年第1期70-77,共8页
Journal of Guangdong University of Finance & Economics
基金
国家自然科学基金项目(71202097)
国家社会科学基金项目(15BGL064)
广东省高校优秀青年教师培养计划项目(Yqgdufe1401)
关键词
家族管理
民营企业
债务融资
代理成本
family management
private enterprise
debt financing
agency cost
