摘要
第三方支付平台企业采取免费策略是否构成掠夺性定价行为,理论界存在着较大争议。如果依照单边市场规制理论,第三方支付平台企业非中性的定价机制与反垄断法所规制的掠夺性定价之间存在着悖论。以"结构—行为"为分析框架,依据双边市场理论对第三支付平台企业掠夺性定价进行反垄断法分析。通过对市场结构和企业市场力量的考察发现,在第三方支付市场中已经形成了寡头垄断的竞争格局,存在着对掠夺方有利的市场结构;在判断第三方支付平台企业是否存在低于成本定价的行为时,可以通过比较两边市场的总成本和总价格来认定;具有市场势力的第三方支付平台企业具备提高价格的能力,可以通过只提高交易费而不增加注册费的方式来弥补掠夺期间受到的损失;同时,由于一体化的经营模式,不同产品市场之间的交叉补贴也是第三方支付企业能够持续低价并收回损失的一个重要渠道。
There are different views of whether predatory pricing exist or not when on one side the product is given for free in the third party payment. From perspective of two-side markets theory,this paper will try to analysis problems on predatory pricing in the third party payment. In the beginning the essay will point out current arguments on predatory pricing in the third party payment. And the third party payment market is defined structural conditions that involve oligopoly and high entry barriers. Then the paper will explain that the price structure in the third party payment market would more likely be designed to get both sides of the market ＂on board ＂. Predatory pricing can occur when prices on both sides of the market are set by a firm at a level that is insufficient to cover the total variable costs of the platform. The rule would be that the price is deem as predatory if the price level is below AVG on both sides of the market together. Also the paper will explain how the third party payment platform reap the benefit of supra competitive. they would finance this below cost selling by raising their prices in other areas.
出处
《河北法学》
CSSCI
北大核心
2016年第4期29-38,共10页
Hebei Law Science
关键词
第三方支付
平台企业
双边市场
掠夺性定价
反垄断法
third party payment
platform
two-side market
predatory pricing
anti-monopoly law
