小群体中互惠行为机理研究:基于行为经济学视角被引量：6

A Study on the Mechanisms of Small-group Reciprocal Behavior

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摘要小群体中互惠行为是常见的交往方式,因其司空见惯和跨学科特性使其背后行为机理并未得到学术界的重视。实际上,它伴随人类社会而生,先于市场交易机制而存在,是更加古老的交往机制。依附于人的社会性与生理性特征,它在一定范围内一直存在着,并且比市场交易机制更加有效。与市场交易机制不同,它不需要划分产权,也没有交割环节,更重要的是,它是一个自我执行机制。施惠者的行为成本低廉,而受惠者获益则较高,施惠者与受惠者的成本与收益分立且不对称催生了互惠行为。互惠行为者的心理账户是小群体互惠行为的行为经济学机制,它可以有效抑制互惠双方的机会主义行为。小群体中当事人较高频率的互动也有助于限制其机会主义行为。除了效率之外,互惠行为实施还可促进施惠者与受惠者的社会情感交流,提高个体应对困难与风险的能力。此理论可运用于企事业的劳动管理,以此构建在契约化的劳动团队管理基础上发挥劳动团队内的互惠行为机制作用,以促进员工之间的信息、知识与技能的互补合作。 Reciprocal behavior in small groups is a common form of human interaction. Its commonality and trans-disciplinary feature lead to the lack of attention to its underneath mechanism. However,reciprocal behavior has been an inherent part of human society,and precedes the market transaction mechanism as a more antique transaction mechanism. Based on the social and physiological features of human beings,reciprocal mechanism has long been in existence and is more effective than the market transaction mechanism. Unlike the latter,reciprocal mechanism requires neither definition,nor delivery of property right,and is a self-reinforced mechanism. The benefit giver has lower action cost,the benefit receiver has higher utility,and this separateness and asymmetry features between cost and benefit facilitate the reciprocal behavior. Actors＇ mental accounting is the behavioral economic mechanism of reciprocal behavior in small groups,as helps constrain the actors＇ opportunistic behavior. The higher interaction frequency of the actors in small groups also contributes the constraint of opportunistic behavior. Besides efficiency,reciprocal behavior can promote the social and emotional exchange among the actors, thus enhance the actors＇ capability in dealing with difficulty and risk. The theory can be applied to organizational labor management to construct a reciprocal behavior mechanism for labor groups on the basis of contractual labor management,and also to promote employees＇ complementation and cooperation in information,knowledge and skills.

作者严维石

机构地区广东财经大学中央财经大学财政学院

出处《中央财经大学学报》 CSSCI 北大核心 2016年第3期82-87,共6页 Journal of Central University of Finance & Economics

基金国家社科一般项目"嵌入互惠行为的企业激励机制研究"(项目编号:15BJY067) 中央财经大学中国财政发展协同创新中心课题"财局与政局关系研究项目"(项目编号:011250315002)

关键词小群体互惠行为成本与收益不对称心理账户机会主义行为 Small group Reciprocal behavior Cost and benefit asymmetry Mental accounting Opportunistic behavior

分类号 C912 [经济管理]

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