摘要
在考虑企业和地方政府的声誉的基础上,分析了高能耗企业碳减排中各主体及其行为倾向,构建了中央政府与地方政府间、地方政府与高能耗企业间的博弈模型,并分析了两模型的混合策略均衡解。研究结果表明:提高中央政府的检查效率、降低检查成本、加大惩罚力度、提高声誉对地方政府和企业的影响、提高地方政府做假时需付出的伪装成本,可以有效制约地方政府和高能耗企业的欺骗及做假行为。最后,提出了提高高能耗企业减排积极性、避免企业与地方政府合谋行为发生的政策建议。
Considering the reputation of energy-intensive enterprises and local government,this paper analyzes the behavior of every agent in the game.Then it builds the game models between central government and local government as well as local government and energy-intensive enterprises,and analyzes the mixed strategy Nash equilibriums.The result indicates as follows：improving central government′s inspection efficiency,decreasing inspection cost,heavier penalties,increasing the impact of reputation on local government and energy-intensive enterprises and increasing the camouflage cost of local government′s fraud,help to restrict their behaviors effectively.Finally,it puts forward several policy suggestions in order to enhance energy-intensive enterprises′motivation to carbon reduction and avoid the collusion.
出处
《技术经济》
CSSCI
北大核心
2016年第3期81-87,101,共8页
Journal of Technology Economics
基金
国家自然科学基金项目"基于异质性主体行为的产业集群低碳演化模型及其仿真研究"(71271159)
国家社会科学基金重大项目"全面深化改革视阈下社会治理体制与机制创新研究"(14ZDA062)
关键词
高能耗企业
碳减排
合谋
政府声誉
企业声誉
博弈分析
energy-intensive enterprise
carbon reduction
collusion
government reputation
enterprise reputation
game analysis
