摘要
论文建立了包含制造商和再制造商的博弈模型,两个制造商都为他们的产品提供包括保修和广告在内的服务;在两种产品具有相同销售价格的假设条件下,通过研究政府对再制造品的服务谁以及原产品利用率进行补贴这两种情况,分析补贴政策对新产品和再制造品的服务水平、产量以及利润的影响,并用数值仿真对其进行数量方面的证实,从而为政府出台相关补贴政策提供意见和建议。
This paper establishes a game model which consists of two manufacturers, one is the traditional manufacturers that produce the new product; the other is the remanufacturer that produces the remanufactured products. Assuming that both of the manufacturers provide warranty services and advertising for their products, and the two kinds of products are of the same price. The paper studies the government subsidies considering service and recycling rate, and analyzes the impact of subsidies on traditional remanufacturer＇s service level and output as well as profits. Based on the numerical simulation, this paper provides advice and suggestions for the government＇s policy-related subsidies.
出处
《湖南商学院学报》
2016年第1期40-45,共6页
Journal of Hunan Business College
基金
国家自然科学基金(编号:71540002)
关键词
电子产品
服务
再制造
补贴政策
electronic products
service
remanufacturing
subsidy policy
