摘要
研究目的:分析因预期征地导致的设施农用地流转双方为竞相获取附着物补偿费而引发的冲突及磨合机理,为解决农地流转冲突提供新视角。研究方法:博弈分析法、个案分析法和归纳总结法。研究结果:(1)联盟村设施农用地流转市场特征:受预期征地影响、地权主体和定着物产权主体分离、卖方市场特征和信用租赁特征;(2)设施农用地转出方为预期征地做准备,通过低价购买方式与转入方进行地上定着物交易,从而攫取附着物补偿费;(3)转入方在"不出售"策略占优时选择低价交易出售地上定着物的实质是相关制度法规的缺失,导致流转双方权利模糊不清,致使农户出现权利行使偏差,造成强势产权对劣势产权的侵蚀。研究结论:需尽快构建设施农用地地上空间权利,当然,需要处理好土地承包经营权与地上定着物所有权的关系,清晰界定两种权利在土地空间权利占有中的权能,逐步建立起产权相对明晰的土地制度。
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the conflict and running-in mechanism from the subjects of facilities agricultural land transfer competing to obtain attachments compensation because of expected land acquisition as well as to offer a new perspective for solving the conflict of farmland transfer. Methods employed include game theory analysis and case study. The results show that the characteristics of land transfer market include expected land acquisition effect, rights subjects of land and property separation, seller's market characteristics and credit leasing characteristics. Transfer-out side makes preparation for expected land acquisition and buy land facilities from transfer-in side in a low price compulsorily in order to capture the attachments compensation. The essence of transferin side selling the land facilities in a low price when "no-sale" strategy is better is the lack of relevant systems and regulations, which results in the rights ambiguous, household actions disorder and strong rights eroding weak rights. Based on the analysis above, we can conclude that it is important to build space rights of facilities agricultural land. Of course, the relation between land-use contracts and ownership of land facilities should be well dealt and two kinds of rights in the possession of the land space rights should be defined clearly so as to establish clear land property rights system accumulatively.
出处
《中国土地科学》
CSSCI
北大核心
2016年第1期32-39,共8页
China Land Science
基金
国家自然科学基金(71103068)
农业部公益性行业项目(200903009-2)
教育部博士学科点基金博导类项目(20112325110007)
黑国土科研(201411)
关键词
土地制度
设施农用地流转
预期征地
博弈
land institution
facilities agricultural land transfer
expected land acquisition
game theory