摘要
以南京市为例,介绍了引导资金基金化运作的功能定位和运行组织;并基于交易成本经济学视角,分析了基金化运作中交易成本、不完全契约、资产专用性的负面影响,揭示了根本性转变后社会资本被套牢和敲竹杠的原因。研究发现:引导基金的基金化运作有利于吸引社会资本参与城市基础设施建设,但其意义首先在于筹集增量资金和置换政府存量债务,其次才是降低治理成本。为此,需要从五个方面加强基金化运作的综合治理:合理引导社会资本进入资产专用性相对低的公共产品和服务领域,增加基金化运作的透明度,提高基金依法监管能力,建立适当让渡社会资本的退出机制,做实各项政策性引导基金。
Taking Nanjing municipal fund operation of infrastructure guidance fund as an example and based on the theory of transaction cost economics,this article analyzes the negative impact of the transaction costs on the fund operation,imperfect contract and asset specificity,and reveals the reason why social capital is stuck in holdup problem after a fundamental change. On this basis,five comprehensive strategies are proposed： reasonably guiding social capital into public goods and services that are relatively low in asset specificity; increasing the transparency of the fund operation; improving the supervisory ability of the fund in accordance with the law; establishing the operation mode of the master-feeder funds and consolidating the policy guidance fund.
出处
《财经论丛》
CSSCI
北大核心
2016年第4期45-53,共9页
Collected Essays on Finance and Economics
基金
国家社科基金资助项目(15BGL056)
江苏高校哲学社会科学研究资助项目(2015SJB500)
关键词
城镇化
引导资金
融资
资产专用性
基础设施建设
urbanization
guidance fund
financing
asset specificity
infrastructure construction
