摘要
本文针对我国传统化工企业安全生产管理机制治理存在的漏洞,基于Stackelberg博弈模型,对政府部门与化工企业之间进行动态博弈分析。首先针对政府制定安全生产管理机制的策略、针对化工企业确定产量与安全成本的策略,同时引入政府监管检查概率、社会公众监督举报安全事故的概率,以政府部门的社会效益、化工企业的经营效益为支付,分析政府与化工企业的最优反应函数,构建一种新的安全生产管理机制治理研究模型。研究发现,化工企业投入的安全生产管理费用是单位产量可变成本、被政府查处或被社会公众监督举报概率、平均损失、罚款的递增函数。政府制定的平均罚款金额是平均损失、被政府查处或被社会公众监督举报概率的递减函数。化工企业安全成本与生产成本比例的最小值与投入的最大资金呈正相关,与安全事故造成的损害上限呈负相关。通过对博弈模型进行算例分析,发现模拟结果与研究结果相一致。本文的结论可以看作是对当下提高企业安全生产管理机制合理性与有效性的一种思考。
Chemical industry is the important basic industry of national economy,however production safety management is in grim situation because of the particularity of its production.Owing to the disadvantage of safety production management mechanism in traditional chemical enterprises,the chemical enterprise safety production management mechanism research model is built,which is based on Stackelberg game model,to study the dynamic game analysis between government and chemical enterprises.In the paper,safety production management mechanism determined by government,production and security costs decided by chemical enterprise are analyzed.Moreover,according to a research on optimal reaction function of both government and chemical enterprise,a new model is constructed to study safety production management mechanism,based on economic benefit and security benefit of two players,with a series of parameters,which are composed of inspect probability.Then research results are as followed.Safety production management cost decided by chemical enterprise increases with the increase of variable cost per unit of production,inspect probability,average loss and fine.Fine determined by government decreases with the increase of fine,average loss and inspect probability.The minimum ratio of safe cost and production cost in chemical enterprise is positively correlated with the maximum investment funds,yet negatively correlated with the safety accident damage limit.It is found that simulation results are consistent with study,according to the numerical simulation of game model.The conclusion of this paper can be regarded as a reference to improve the rationality and effectiveness of enterprise safety production management mechanism.
出处
《中国管理科学》
CSSCI
北大核心
2016年第3期159-168,共10页
Chinese Journal of Management Science
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(70871080
71171134)
上海市教委科研创新重点项目(11ZS138)
上海市哲学社会科学规划课题(2011BGL006)
上海市一流学科建设项目(S1201YLXK)
