摘要
在建筑市场中,传统经济学中理性"经济人"的假设与现实不符,工程监理并非仅仅追求自身收益的最大化,还会关注其收益的公平性。以Holmstrom-Milgrom模型为基础,引入公平心理偏好理论构建业主和工程监理间的最优风险分担与激励契约模型,探究工程监理在承担多项任务时,公平心理偏好和信用偏好对最优风险分担与激励契约的影响。研究结果表明:工程监理风险分担与其公平心理偏好正相关,与信用偏好负相关,若保持公平心理偏好和信用偏好适度均衡,则业主只需对工程监理提供固定薪酬契约即可达到帕累托最优。当工程监理承担的两项任务的成本函数为互补关系或替代成本足够小时,公平心理偏好使得风险分担增大。
In the construction market, the rational ＂economic man＂ hypothesis in traditional economics is against to the actual situation. The supervisors are NOT egoistical who not only pursue their private profits, but also are concerned about whether they get fair income. This paper builds the optimal risk-sharing and incentive contract model based on Holmstrom-Milgrom model and fair psychology preference theory between the owner and the supervisor, which studies the effect on the risk-sharing and incentive contract of the fairness preference and credit preference while the supervisor undertakes various tasks. The results indicate that the risk-sharing is positively associated with the fairness preference negatively with the credit preference. If keeping fairness preference and credit preference moderately balanced, the owner provides fixed salary contract for the supervisor that Pareto optimality can be reached. When the cost function of the two tasks is complementary relationship or replacement costs are low enough, the fairness preference caused risk-sharing increases.
出处
《电子科技大学学报（社科版）》
2016年第2期73-79,共7页
Journal of University of Electronic Science and Technology of China(Social Sciences Edition)
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(71172148
71231006)
住房和城乡建设部软科学研究项目(2011-R3-18)
关键词
公平心理偏好
风险分担
信用偏好
激励
工程监理
fairness preferences
risk-sharing
credit preference
incentive
supervisor
