摘要
提高中国水电施工企业作为国际设计-采购-施工(EPC)项目总承包商的设计管理能力有助于指导中国企业开拓国际水电市场。该文基于博弈理论,构建了总承包商与设计方之间的单期-多期激励模型,根据双方努力水平与收益矩阵变化,演绎了双方之间激励作用机理。基于7个国际水电EPC项目案例,对模型分析进行了实证检验。结果表明:1)设置激励机制有利于促进总承包商和设计方提高努力水平,优化设计,进而提升双方收益;2)单期激励对设计优化有促进作用,但设计方存在"机会主义"动机,激励效果不稳定;3)多期激励基于长期合作共赢理念,可维护总承包商和设计方之间合作关系的稳定性,激励效果更为明显;4)总承包商在EPC项目设计管理中应择优选择设计方、加强设计评审,并同设计方建立长期合作伙伴关系。
China＇s hydropower construction companies need to strengthen their design management for international EPC（engineering-procurement-construction） project delivery. Gaming theory was used to develop single-period and multi-period incentive models to investigate the incentive mechanisms between contractors and designers.The models were used to analyze 7international EPC projects.The results show that：1）Design incentives promote optimum designs which add value to the project and benefit both contractors and designers.2）Single-period incentives can lead to opportunistic behaviour,which may reduce the effectiveness of the design incentives.3） The introduction of strategic benefits in multi-period incentives effectively strengthens the stability of long-term cooperation and maximize the benefits to contractors and designers in the long run.4）EPC contractors should establish partnering relationships with qualified designers based on incentive evaluations.
出处
《清华大学学报（自然科学版）》
EI
CAS
CSCD
北大核心
2016年第4期354-359,共6页
Journal of Tsinghua University(Science and Technology)
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(51379104,51079070,50539130,70671058)
水沙科学与水利水电工程国家重点实验室课题资助项目(2013-KY-5,2009-ZY-7)
关键词
设计-采购-施工(EPC)项目
水电项目
设计管理
激励机制
博弈
engineering-procurement-construction（EPC）projects
hydropower engineering
design management
incentive mechanism
game theory
