摘要
1994年分税制改革以来中国存在一个难以被一般经济规律所解释的特殊现象:税收收入长期超GDP增长的"中国税收增长之谜"。本文发现它与中国式分税制的设计及税收征管集权改革密切相关。中央税收征管集权改革不仅直接有利于提高国税部门的征管效率,而且通过压缩地税部门的"征管空间"限制了地方政府的横向税收竞争行为。本文在地区间横向税收竞争的实证框架中加入中央税收征管集权变量所得的实证结果与理论预期一致,中央税收征管集权改革显著抑制了地区间横向税收竞争的程度。同时,由于中国式分权的基本特征并未改变,中国式分税制没有破坏中国经济增长的基本动力机制,从而实现了经济增长与税收收入的同向增长。但与中央税收集权改革相伴随的实际税率水平的上升可能抑制长期的经济增长。本文的发现对新常态下完善现代财政制度的改革有着重要的启示意义:需要重新考虑修正与更高的征管效率相对应的名义税率水平,保持税收收入与经济协调增长的良性关系;加强规范地方政府以非税收入工具进行的横向竞争行为;确实转向以事权划分为基础的改革,并在此基础上深化财权财力分配改革。
There was a particular phenomenon which was difficult to be explained by the general economic laws after the tax-sharing reform in 1994： the puzzle of abnormal tax growth in China. This paper finds that the puzzle was related with the tax-sharing system and the reform of tax collection centralization. The tax collection centralization not only helped directly to improve the efficiency of national tax bureaus, but also limited the horizontal tax competition between local governments by compressing the ＂collection space＂ of local tax bureaus. The paper does an empirical test on the hypothesis using an empirical framework of horizontal tax competition with tax collection centralization. The results are consistent with the theoretical expectations. The increase in tax collection centralization reduced significantly the extent of horizontal tax competition between local governments. At the same time, Chinese tax-sharing system doesn＇t destroy basically the incentive systems of Chinese economic development. Therefore, the economic growth was accompanied by the more tax revenue growth. However, the increasing real tax rate with the reform of tax centralization could curb the long-term economic growth. The findings could give some important implications to perfect the modem fiscal system under China＇s New Normal： adjusting normal tax rate fitting with the higher level of tax collection efficiency, regulating local governments＇ horizontal competition behavior with non-tax tools, defining clearly the respective powers of the central and local governments and making appropriate division of fiscal revenue between them.
出处
《中国工业经济》
CSSCI
北大核心
2016年第5期92-108,共17页
China Industrial Economics
基金
国家社会科学基金重大项目"健全公共财政体系研究"(批准号10zd&036)
福建省社会科学规划项目"基于环境联邦主义视角的中国政府间环境事权划分研究"(批准号2014B110)
中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助项目"中国式税收分成激励的经济效应研究"(批准号20720161013)
关键词
税收竞争
税收征管集权
中国税收增长之谜
tax competition
tax collection centralization
the puzzle of abnormal tax growth in China
