摘要
本文从理论研究和计算实验两个层次分析和验证了一类带有时间偏好的单边双类型不完全信息议价博弈模型及其序贯均衡,运用单阶段偏离法则分别推导和证明了该议价博弈的合并均衡与分离均衡,并通过策略比较和构造静态出价博弈证明了合并均衡是议价博弈的唯一理性解.在此基础上,本文设计不完全信息议价博弈计算实验场景,基于协同演化计算实验方法验证了议价博弈的序贯均衡解.最后,本文探讨了该序贯均衡对于议价双方相应管理策略的实践指导意义.
This paper analyzes and experimentally validates the sequential equilibrium of a bargaining game with onesided incomplete information about players time preferences. Using one-stage-deviation principle, we deduce the pooling equilibrium and separating equilibrium of this bargaining game, respectively, and we prove by strategy comparison and constructing a static offer game that the pooling equilibrium is the unique rational solution to the bargaining model. We also design the computational experiments for the bargaining game with incomplete information, and quantitively validate the sequential equilibrium solution via co-evolution-based computational experiments. Towards the end, we discuss the practical significance of our research findings.
出处
《自动化学报》
EI
CSCD
北大核心
2016年第5期724-734,共11页
Acta Automatica Sinica
基金
国家自然科学基金(71472174
71102117
61533019
71232006
61233001)资助~~
关键词
不完全信息议价
序贯均衡
单阶段偏离法则
协同演化
计算实验
Bargaining with incomplete information
sequential equilibrium
one-stage-deviation principle
co-evolution
computational experiments
